In 1939, the Brazilian government under Getulio Vargas created the country's second national park around the Iguazu falls, at the border with Argentina. The new Iguazu National Park was located at a sparsely inhabited area in southwestern Brazil, a region that for decades had been a source of geopolitical concern to public officials and the military. The creation of a national park at Iguazu was part of a boom in conservationist measures promoted by the Vargas Regime—in the 1930s the Brazilian government created two other national parks and enacted a new set environmental laws. The creation of Iguazu was also concomitant to the "March to the West", a major national campaign devised by the Vargas to open up the Brazilian hinterland for colonization. This article demonstrates that the creation of the Iguazu National Park cannot be understood without taking into account the contemporary efforts to colonize Brazil’s hinterland and nationalize the country’s borderlands.

Key words: National Park; Environmental Policy; Estado Novo; Environmental History.

En 1939 el gobierno brasileño bajo Getulio Vargas creó el segundo parque nacional del país en torno a las Cataratas del Iguazú, en la frontera con Argentina. El nuevo parque se encontraba en una zona poco poblada del suroeste de Brasil, una región que durante décadas había sido una fuente de preocupación geopolítica para funcionarios de gobierno y los militares. La creación de un parque nacional en Iguazú fue parte de un boom de medidas de conservación promovidas por el régimen de Vargas. En los mismos años ‘30 el gobierno brasileño creó otros dos parques nacionales y una nueva legislación ambiental. La creación del Parque Nacional de Iguazú también fue concomitante con la “Marcha al Oeste”, la campaña nacional concebida por Vargas para abrir el interior de Brasil a la colonización. Este artículo muestra que la creación del Parque Nacional de Iguazú no puede entenderse sin tener en cuenta los esfuerzos del estado brasileño para colonizar el interior del país y nacionalizar sus fronteras.

Palabras clave: Parque Nacional; Política Ambiental; Estado Novo; Historia Ambiental.
Em 1939 o governo brasileiro sob Getúlio Vargas criou o segundo parque nacional do país ao redor das Cataratas do Iguaçu, na fronteira com a Argentina. O novo parque localizava-se em uma área pouco habitada do sudoeste brasileiro, uma região que durante décadas havia sido fonte de preocupação geopolítica tanto para membros do governo quanto para os militares. A criação de um parque nacional no Iguaçu fez parte de um boom de medidas conservacionistas promovidas pelo regime de Vargas—na mesma década de 1930 o governo brasileiro criou outros dois parques nacionais e uma nova legislação ambiental, inédita no país. A criação do Parque Nacional do Iguaçu foi também concomitante à “Marcha para o Oeste”, a famosa campanha nacional concebida por Vargas para abrir o interior do Brasil à colonização. Este artigo demonstra que a criação do Parque Nacional do Iguaçu não pode ser compreendida sem levar-se em conta os esforços do estado brasileiro para colonizar interior do país e nacionalizar suas fronteiras.

Palavras-chave: Parque Nacional; Política Ambiental; Estado Novo; História Ambiental.

Introduction

Map 1: IGUAÇU NATIONAL PARK, PARANÁ, BRAZIL C. 1944

A Park for the Borderlands: The Creation of the Iguaçu National Park in Southern Brazil, 1880-1940
Frederico Freitas
The Iguaçu National Park\(^2\), created in 1939, is one of the most important national parks in Brazil, receiving more than 1.5 million visitors per year who are mainly attracted to its famous cataracts shared with Argentina (see Map 1)\(^3\). It is also one of the few large stretches of preserved Atlantic Forest in the Brazilian territory, a biome that has lost about nine three percent of its original 1,000,000 square kilometers of forests in the 500 years since the arrival of Europeans in South America. However, despite its importance, the park has never been the subject of a detailed study on the circumstances of its creation\(^4\). Iguaçu was established along with two other national parks, Itatiaia (1937), and Serra dos Órgãos (1939), as part of a boom in environmental legislation occurring in Brazil and in a few other Latin America countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and Venezuela). Neighboring Argentina, for example, created its two first national parks in 1934, Nahuel Huapi and Iguazú, the latter at the Argentine side of Iguazu Falls shared with Brazil\(^5\). The 1930s were also a decade of both renewed environmental policy in the United States and greater international exchange of conservationist ideas in the western hemisphere, to the point where the eighth Pan American conference in 1938 recommended the establishment of a committee on the conservation of wildlife\(^6\). Yet, it seems the Iguaçu National park owes its creation more to geopolitical concerns than to the circulation of international ideas on the conservation of nature.

While the Itatiaia and Serra dos Órgãos national parks were established near the city of Rio de Janeiro, in areas of easy access to nature-loving urbanites, Iguaçu was set in a distant, sparsely populated, and backward frontier lacking direct connections with the great Brazilian cities of the Atlantic seaboard. Why did the Vargas regime decide to create a park in such an isolated area, a place out of reach to the majority of possible visitors? This article argues that the choice of Iguaçu as a site for a national park can only be understood as part of the move by the Vargas regime to occupy its own western hinterland, a campaign named “The March to the West”. In the case of Iguaçu, by bringing economic development and territorial control over a sparsely populated border zone, the Brazilian government aimed to incorporate a peripheral region to the nation’s body. To politicians and high-ranking officials in Brazil, national park policy fit into their desire to promote the nationalization of a borderland population they saw as suspiciously foreign. A park would guarantee their share of control of a symbolic landmark, the Iguazu Falls, and promote development through tourism.

Brazil only implemented its first national park, Itatiaia, in 1937, but nationalist politicians, public officials, and military officers had been discussing the strategic use of national parks in national security issues since the early 1930s. Indeed, some believed national parks could play an important role in military affairs, as explained by Army Major João Baptista Magalhães in his response to botanist Alberto José de Sampaio’s article on national parks published in 1931. In his piece, Magalhães argued that conservationist measures such as the reforestation of depleted areas and the establishment of national parks were strategically important to a continent-sized country like Brazil for a series of reasons. First, armies in campaign needed firewood for fuel, and timber for the building of barracks, warehouses, bridges, and trenches. A string of protected areas could supply the army with much-needed raw materials. Furthermore, protected areas could also provide a moving army with forested terrain to hide in and keep operational secrecy, which was especially important in a time when aerial observation and air raids were becoming the norm in warfare. Because the country was sparsely populated, with few settlements and devoid of places for a moving army to get supplies and rest, a network of forested patches was
necessary to supply troops with safe havens to rest and avoid air raids. Magalhães then proposed a system of national parks guarded by military forest rangers, agronomists, and scientists, all living in military colonies. Such system of integrated national parks and military colonies would not only be beneficial for the country for military reasons, but it would also “concur to the solution of the problem of peopling our hinterland”. Besides been one of the many sparsely populated zones of the Brazilian hinterland, the Iguazu Falls area was doubly strategic because of the shared border with Paraguay and Argentina. The region possessed a unique natural monument, was still covered by a lush subtropical forest, and bordered Brazil’s major regional rival, Argentina, thus it seemed to be perfectly poised to receive a national park as proposed by Magalhães in 19317.

An Isolated Borderland

The Brazilian government only created the Iguazu National Park in 1939 as part of a series of measures to nationalize its border area, but the strategic preoccupations leading to its creation were in the mind of politicians and the military since the nineteenth century. In 1889, fifty years before the park creation, the Brazilian imperial government founded a military colony in the region. The colony later gave origin to the town of Foz do Iguaçu. The goal of the Brazilian empire was to promote colonization to secure a region whose Portuguese, and later the Brazilian sovereignty had long been in question, despite long-defined political borders. In fact, the region was not devoid of people, as the Guarani and the Kaingang lived there, but in the minds of imperial and provincial rulers only settled Portuguese-speaking Christians could guarantee state sovereignty on the border. In 1853, the São Paulo fifth district was elevated to the category of province, but with only 62,000 inhabitants, the newly created Paraná province lacked people to embark on a colonization mission in its extreme west. Yet, throughout the nineteenth century, state-sponsored expeditions were launched in attempts to connect the western borderlands to the rest of the province and tame its “bellicose” Indians. In the 1840s the provincial government opened a trail cutting deep into the forest as a way to encourage farmers from the frontier town of Guarapuava to move westwards, but this initiative fell short on promoting colonization for lack of interested settlers. In the 1850s the empire tacitly recognized its incapacity to colonize the region and signed a treaty with the neighboring country allowing Argentine boats to sail the Paraná and Iguazu Rivers up into Brazilian territory. By the 1880s there was already a considerable presence of Argentine and Paraguayan mate gatherers in the region, which reignited Brazil’s interest in the area and the desire to create a military colony as a means to establish a stronghold at the border.

The army expedition that founded the military colony of Foz do Iguaçu left Guarapuava on September 13, 1889. After 69 days of privation, torrential rains, jaguar attacks, and clashes with indigenous peoples, the party led by Captain José Joaquim Firmino arrived at the confluence of the Paraná and Iguazu Rivers -the international triple border separating Brazil from Paraguay and Argentina- where they founded a military colony. The area reached by Firmino and his companions was already inhabited, and besides the indigenous population there were also “324 Christian souls”, of whom only nine were Brazilian nationals. The foundation of the Military Colony of Foz do Iguaçu helped Brazil to establish a presence in the region in the long term, but in the early
1900s the military in Rio de Janeiro deemed the colony as a failure. Despite the region’s fertile red soil, agriculture developed poorly and Brazilian settlers had to resort to logging and gathering mate to make do. Because Argentine entrepreneurs controlled the extractive industry, logging and mate gathering were seen by the Brazilian military as predatory endeavors unfit for settlers committed to the land. Moreover, the lack of a direct connection with the rest of Brazil made the colony completely dependent on Argentina to survive. Eventually the military lost interest in the colony and in 1912 the Ministry of War decided to pass the control of the colony over to the state government. Thus, in that following year the military colony became part of the municipality of Guarapuava, located 350 kilometers away.

The failure of the military colony of Foz do Iguaçu in establishing a viable settlement based on subsistence agriculture reveals two main aspects of the region before the 1940s. First, geography made the region isolated from the rest of Brazil at the same it connected the area to Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Paraguay. Second, entrepreneurs and workers coming from Argentina and Paraguay dominated mate gathering and logging, the two main economic activities in the region. These two characteristics of the region, isolation and the presence of foreigners were important factors influencing the creation of the Iguazu National Park in 1939.

The region’s isolation derived from the lack of viable routes between Brazil’s densely populated Atlantic shores and its western backdoor. In the late 1930s the Brazilian government issued a call for tenders for the navigation of the Brazilian section of the Paraná River, but the government in Rio failed to find parties interested in the concession, even after offering an annual subsidy of 500 contos de réis. In this period, the banks of upper Paraná were still sparsely populated, and a few impoverished fishing settlements were not attractive enough for entrepreneurs seeking to profit with the transportation of goods and people. The southern Brazilian section of the Paraná, limited by the Sete Quedas Falls in the north and Foz do Iguaçu in the south, was a contrast to the desolation found before the falls, as it harbored the several mate and logging companies whose steamships connected more than fifteen ports in the Brazilian territory to the downriver city of Posadas in Argentina. Yet, the same Sete Quedas Falls that represented a formidable barrier to the northward penetration of Argentine companies into Brazilian territory also imposed a serious obstacle for boats coming from São Paulo to reach Foz do Iguaçu. The border town was isolated from the rest of Brazil not only by the thick carpet of forests still covering most of the western half of the state of Paraná during this period, but also because its two waterways were sealed off to navigation coming from the populated coastal areas of Brazil by two major cataracts: Sete Quedas in the Paraná River and Iguazu in the Iguazu River. Since colonial times, the two massive obstacles barred north and eastward penetration coming from the Spanish empire. However, as hurdles the waterfalls worked both ways, preventing the Portuguese (an later the Brazilians) from controlling a region that legally was theirs since after the Treaty of San Idelfonso. Land connections offered little in the matter of an alternative route to the waterways. By the time the park was created in 1939, the 350-kilometer land trail connecting Foz do Iguaçu to Guarapuava had already been turned into a dirt road that cut through large tracts of forest (see Map 2). However, the road suffered from chronic lack of maintenance making it impassable for most of the year, especially during rain season. A Paraná state government official traveling through this road in 1925 in a Ford truck recalled his experience as an extremely difficult feat. The road was
precarious and the car required frequent stops to “have its parts disassembled in order to fix something”. For days they had no sight of human beings.10.
As a result of unreliable land connections, transportation continued to be done mostly by river. Until the late 1920s, the most common routes connecting the populated coastal areas of Brazil to Foz do Iguaçu passed through Argentina. Unsurprisingly, Brazilians traveling the borderlands were deeply concerned with the massive presence of Argentines in the area. They also noticed the increasing number of tourists coming from Argentina to visit the Iguazu Falls. Before air transportation was available there were no direct routes connecting coastal Brazil to Foz do Iguazu. The oldest one circumvented waterfalls and jungle through Buenos Aires, which
required a traveler from Rio or São Paulo a layover in the Argentine capital before continuing the trip northwards by boat and train through Argentine territory (see Map 3). The opening of the São Paulo-Rio Grande railroad allowed travelers to skip Buenos Aires all together, but the route still required crossing Argentina to reach Foz do Iguaçu (see Map 4). Another route was partially opened in 1917 with the construction of a private, sixty-kilometer-long narrow gauge railway circumventing the Sete Quedas Falls. A mate and lumber company, Companhia Mate Laranjeira, had built the railway, and the firm prioritized the portage of its own goods over passengers. This shorter route was only opened to the general public after 1929, when the government of Paraná expropriated the private railroad (see map 5). This brought Foz do Iguaçu closer to São Paulo, but the frontier town was still far away from its state capital Curitiba. It was only in 1935, when the Brazilian army implemented a weekly airmail service connecting Curitiba to Foz do Iguaçu and Guairá, that the region started having regular communication with the rest of Brazil. Two years later, the Pan Am subsidiary in Brazil, Panair do Brasil, established weekly stops in Foz do Iguaçu as part of its Rio de Janeiro-Asuncion-Buenos Aires route12.

The Fear of Hispanicization

The long delay in the opening of regular communication channels with the rest of Brazil made a lasting impression in the way Brazilians saw the borderlands.

The lack of de-facto defined borders was a constant cause of concern for government officials and visitors to the region. They feared that the dependency from Argentina and the massive presence of Argentines and Paraguayans in Brazilian territory could undermine Brazil’s control of the area. From the 1880s to the 1930s a type of enterprise known in Portuguese as obrage dominated the economy of western Paraná. Obrages were a system of extracting timber and mate from areas of subtropical forest that had developed in Northeastern Argentina and Eastern Paraguay. Argentines entrepreneurs introduced obrages in Brazil in the 1880s, a couple of years before the foundation of the military colony. In Argentina, in the province of Corrientes and the territory of Misiones, the focus of the obrages was solely on logging, but up north in Paraguay and Brazil the obrageiros combined logging with the gathering and processing of mate leaves, whose trees were abundant in the subtropical forests alongside the Paraná River. Montevideo and Buenos Aires were the main markets for the mate coming downriver from Brazil and Paraguay. In Brazil, Spanish-speaking entrepreneurs like Nuñes y Gibaja, Miguel Matte, Julio T. Allica, Domingos Barthe, and Jesús Val obtained concessions from the Brazilian government for logging and gathering of mate and employed workers of indigenous and mestizo descent, many of them Guaraní recruited in Argentina and Paraguay. A steamboat would drop off a gang of workers at a forested area on the eastern bank of the Paraná, where they would stay for months in a row. The workers would first clear the area and build a port with warehouses and facilities to dry mate leaves or cut logs. From this bridgehead they would penetrate the surrounding forest in search for more timber and mate13.

This dominance of Argentine entrepreneurs in the economic life of this isolated region generated the fear among Brazilian observers that the border zone was becoming too Hispanicized.
Already in 1905, the Brazilian journalist Domingos Nascimento lamented that “our neglect has reached the point where we have given the exploitation of our forests and mate groves -all the commercial life of this zone- to Argentines whose unfurled flag travels on their boats through the Brazilian borderlands, free of competition”. Three decades later, the army officer José de Lima Figueiredo complained the forest had been “ruthlessly cleared” by Argentines who had failed to build permanent infrastructure that outlast such destruction. The dominance of the Spanish language was another issue for many outside visitors, who were appalled by the fact that the Castilla was the lingua franca in the region. The large presence of a Guarani population from Paraguay and Argentina, who used Guarani as their internal language and Spanish in their communication with non-Guarani speakers, was another source of concern. One government official in 1925 was shocked to know that even Brazilian-born schoolchildren in Foz do Iguaçu could not speak clear Portuguese, free of Hispanicisms. The prevalent use of the Argentine peso moneda nacional was another issue for outsider observers. Otilia Schilmmelpfeng, a pioneer in the region, recalled in an interview in 1987 the extent to which the local economy was dependent on Argentina,

Everything would come from Argentina. We had no contact with Brazil. ... The reimbursement we would get in Puerto Aguirre [in Argentina]. Foodstuff would come from the steamboats. ... Posh stuff, fine wines, canned food, everything would reach Foz do Iguaçu, and that is why our tables were full, but all came through Argentina. There were many things whose names we only knew in Spanish. We had even forgotten the Portuguese language, as we would mostly speak Castilian. It is enough to say that outsiders needed to learn Castilian because it was better for being understood. This was how Foz do Iguaçu was. This was the environment, everything was foreign, Argentine. We felt completely isolated from the Brazilian side. We did not know the mil-réis. 

One of the fiercest critics of the Argentine presence in the region was the tenentista leader João Cabanas. In 1924, after a defeated uprising against the republican government of Artur Bernardes in the city of São Paulo, João Cabanas led a column of rebellious military through the states of São Paulo and Paraná to the region of Foz do Iguaçu, where they stayed for months fighting the Brazilian army. In his memoir published in 1928, Cabanas was extremely critical of the presence of Argentines in the region. He described how the system of bonded labor adopted in the obrages subjected Paraguayan and Brazilian workers to increasing debt. He was shocked that Argentine overseers, who “avowedly disliked the workers”, were free to exert life-and-death powers over their employees, all with the omission of the Brazilian authorities. Cabanas saw the rule of Argentine foremen and administrators as an affront to Brazilian law and sovereignty. He pointed that the absence of state power in the region was causing Brazilians to “live and die like animals, without the benefits of the law, public education, and social welfare”.

Cabanas was also particularly obsessed with the threat of an eventual Argentine invasion through Foz do Iguaçu. He argued that he and his men, who comprised a tiny army, with no material resources, and no previous knowledge of the terrain, had been able to hold their ground and resist the attack of the government forces led by the General Cândido Rondon for eight months. In the case of a war, an Argentine occupation of the Brazilian border zone would be
quick and easy. Moreover, the presence of several Argentine companies with great knowledge of the terrain, monopoly of the transportation, and control of an army of thousands of foreign workers, would certainly give Argentines a huge advantage over the Brazilian army. Argentina had also direct access to Foz do Iguaçu from Buenos Aires through river and railroad. Argentine military forces leaving the country’s capital could reach Foz do Iguaçu in just forty eight hours, while Brazilian troops departing from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo or Rio Grande do Sul would spend at least a week to arrive in the region. The experience of eight months of guerrilla warfare against the Brazilian army gave Cabanas and other tenentista leaders a sense of the fragility of the Brazilian hold over the border zone. The conflict also gave an opportunity to legalist officials fighting in the Brazilian army to know first-hand a borderland connected to Argentina and isolated from Brazil. Both sides shared the same nationalist perspective that saw the “Hispanicization” of the Brazilian border as a problem demanding urgent measures by the government. Some of these officials, including Cabanas, eventually took part in the coup that brought Getúlio Vargas to power in 1930, and the need to nationalize what they called *fronteira guarani* remained a constant guiding principle in the actions of the new government towards the region.

### Seeing like a nationalist state

In September 1931, the first Vargas-appointed intervenor for Paraná, Mário Tourinho, sent a cable to Oswaldo Aranha, Minister of Justice, and José Fernandes Leite de Castro, Minister of War, asking for the return of a military company to Foz do Iguaçu. Tourinho was a retired general, a veteran of the Contestado War, and the leader of the pro-Vargas faction that seized control of Paraná in the 1930 coup. Like Cabanas, Tourinho also believed in the threat of a foreign invasion, arguing in his 1931 cable that the presence of the army at the border was necessary to prevent an “impending” incursion of foreign elements. Overstating the threat of an invasion, the intervenor stressed that “recently, in face of an inevitable invasion of Paraguayan revolutionaries and the illegal incursion of immigrants, the government of Paraná had to hire civilians to defend the border”. Tourinho military style and political inability eventually put him at odds with local elite groups, which gave him a short career as State intervenor -he was substituted in January 1932 by the much more apt career politician Manuel Ribas. Yet, his warnings about a threat of a military invasion, along with Cabanas’ denunciation of the Argentinization of the border, set the tone of Vargas’ view of the region. In a letter to the Minister of War, General João Gomes Ribeiro, Vargas revealed Tourinho as his main source on the vulnerability of the international border in Paraná. Vargas characterized the region as

> ...a zone populated and explored by strange elements, where a cosmopolitan society of newcomers is been formed, without a national spirit, without the feeling of Brazilianess and love for the fatherland, one that could become a dangerous epicenter of disorder, one capable of provoking incidents that would be unpleasant to our interests.

In 1932, nineteen years after the dissolution of the military colony in Foz do Iguaçu, the town received the 1st Independent Border Company to protect the Brazilian borders against an
improbable Argentine and Paraguayan invasion. With the renewed military presence in the region and in the nationalist atmosphere of the 1930s, the old idea of using border military colonies as a defense against foreign penetration was brought back to life. In its 1935 annual report the Ministry of War proposed the government use conscripts instead of families in the military colonies it planned to establish in the borderlands.

Real or not, the idea of an Argentine threat also worked to pressure for the development of the region in other ways, as even on a comparative basis the other side of the border seemed to be faring better. Misiones had a larger population than western Parana, was connected directly to the rest Argentina, and received a national park at their side of the Iguazu Falls in 1934, five years before the creation of its Brazilian counterpart. Already in 1911 the Brazilian congressman Coelho Netto contrasted the “devastation” at the Brazilian side of the border with the “green and dense” neighboring Argentine forests. He stated that “in the future, those who want to describe the exuberance of the Brazilian forest will not need to consult the chronicles, because, by pointing to the Argentine forest, at the opposite margin [of the Iguazu River], they will only have to say: our forest, which was sacrificed, was the sister of that one”. Coelho Netto’s criticism of the way Brazil neglected its forests vis-à-vis Argentina was more a rhetorical device than a balanced assessment of conservation across the border. After all, obrages in Argentina practiced selective logging on a greater scale and had a bigger impact on the forest than their counterparts in Brazil, where mate gathering was a more profitable endeavor. Yet, it attests the recurrent use of a trope of Argentine dominance to push for state intervention at the border.

A general sense of inferiority in relation to the stage of development reached by Argentina was present in the discourse of several other Brazilian government officials. In 1928, the physician Manuel Carrão, secretary of Health of the state of Parana, warned that Argentines were a decade ahead in the planning for the exploitation of the hydroelectric potential of the Iguazu Falls. The easiness of access to the region from Argentina served not only to spur a modest influx of international tourists seeking to visit the legendary Iguazu Falls, but also allowed the Argentine government to consider the feasibility of building a hydroelectric dam at the bi-national falls. Knowing that it would be impossible to unilaterally dam the border river, the Argentines took the opportunity of the Sixth Pan American Conference, held in Havana in January 1928, to propose the internationalization of the falls. Unsurprisingly, Brazilian delegates vehemently opposed the proposal and postponed the discussion indefinitely. Manuel Carrão also pointed that the creation of several facilities crucial for the development of the Argentine side of the border were well under way; in March 1928 Argentina sanctioned laws 5,559 and 6,712, provisioning for the expropriation of a large portion of land around the falls to establish hydroelectric facilities, a military school and a national park. Six years later, federal law 12,103 finally created the Parque Nacional Iguazu at the Argentine side of the Iguazu Falls. The government of Parana used the creation of the Argentine park to pressure the Brazilian government to develop their side of the border, which is revealed in a series of memos sent by the government of Paraná to the presidential office between 1936 and 1938. In a 1938 letter to Getúlio Vargas, Manuel Ribas, the second appointed intervenor for Paraná, asked for funds to rebuild the precarious road connecting Guaraúpava to Foz do Iguacu. Unlike his predecessor Tourinho, Ribas was a civilian, a career politician, whose approach to the problem of the border was more pragmatic -he wanted investments in infrastructure to attract...
Brazilian settlers to the region and to counter federal accusations that blamed the state of Paraná for a history of neglect of its borders. In his letter, Ribas argued that rebuilding the road would be strategic, and an “extraordinary leverage for the progress” of western Paraná. In the borderlands, not only roads, but also national parks were tantamount to progress, and Ribas presented the recently-created Argentine Iguazu National Park as the sign that Brazil was lagging behind; “given the fact that Argentina is planning to expand the area of its park right at the other side of the border, I think it is time for us to think about the organization of our park, to avoid remaining in a position of inferiority”. He went on arguing that the park was halfway ready as the area had already been expropriated by the government of Paraná, and they had even built a “luxurious hotel” near the falls. Ribas added that, “if the federal government does not intend to create the national park in the near future” it should allow the state government to do so, thus preventing Brazil from lagging “far behind its friends and neighbors”. Ribas argued that the recently-created Argentine national park would bring rail and paved roads to the other side, and the only logical step for Brazilians was to emulate the Argentines.

Both the fear of foreign invasions exposed by João Cabanas and Mário Tourinho and the feeling of lagging behind Argentina made explicit by Manuel Ribas fit into the drive to “nationalize borders” present at the onset of Vargas’ administration. Already in December, 1930 Vargas issued the decree 19,482 which obligated Brazilian companies to have a minimum of two thirds of Brazilian employees. The same decree also increased the obstacles to the entry and legal presence of foreigners in Brazil, and made it harder for them to acquire real estate. This decree was aimed to foreigners in general, but preoccupation with the Paraná border made the government in Rio de Janeiro to send a federal committee led by journalist Zeno Silva to investigate the situation in Foz do Iguaçu. The committee painted a dire picture of the border, where only five percent of a population of ten thousand was of Brazilian nationality. The committee report argued that the previous governments had never cared to take measures to colonize the border zone and if things remained on such course soon the presence of immigrants would lead to an international border dispute. The solution, according to the committee, was to nationalize the region through the creation of a border territory directly controlled by Rio de Janeiro. The idea of separating the western portion of Paraná from the rest of the state became a point of contention between the federal and state governments. Although appointed by Vargas, state intervenors frequently played the role of brokers between Rio de Janeiro and local elites. In the 1930s, besides a small pro-Iguazu territory lobby group from Curitiba, the majority of the paranaense elite stood against the dismemberment of their state. Vargas eventually created an Iguazu territory controlled directly by the federal government in 1943, but once he was ousted from office in 1945 the Iguazu territory was dissolved and its territory returned to the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina (see Map 6).
Managing Public Land

The idea of colonizing and integrating the western hinterland guided much of Vargas’s actions during his years in power. In 1937, in a radio broadcast on New Years Eve, Vargas introduced the new spirit of the Estado Novo by announcing that the “true sense of Brazilianess” was the integration of the country’s hinterland to its economic core, a campaign baptized as “The March to the West”. To the eyes of the government, the Brazilian west was a potential source of cheap raw materials and new markets for the industries Vargas intended to create in the eastern part of the country. In the radio show Vargas presented the Brazilian people their mission: to create a unique civilization in the new world. To accomplish such goal, it would be necessary to integrate the entire territory into a harmonious whole, one in which the rational exploitation of natural resources under the guidance of the federal government replaced backward subsistence endeavors like slash-and-burn agriculture. Vargas’s goal was to dissolve local economic particularities into an organic internal market that channeled western resources to eastern industrialization. The March to the West was a state-sponsored ideology of Manifest Destiny that was combined with positivist and fascist ideals of an organic society free of class or regional tensions. To promote this ideal, the Brazilian state needed to drive a colonization process and to control the country’s natural resources.

However, with most of the Brazilian public land in control of the states, the federal government had little resources to manage land use. In the 1934 Constituent Assembly, congressmen argued for the right of the federal government to overrule the states when national
interests were at stake. These national interests would be, as suggested by congressman Alexandre Siciliano, not only the creation of “good land reservations for the protection and conservation of our indigenous peoples”, but also the preservation of “oilfields, and mines”, as well as the “waterfalls, flora, fauna, and natural beauty”, leading to the creation of parks like the Teapot Dome Oil Field or the Yellowstone National Park in the United States. Siciliano also suggested that the right to rule over land located at international borders should be reserved for the federal government in order “to deter, specially in the border zones, an excessive infiltration of aliens and land concentration on foreign hands”. The constitution promulgated in 1934, in its article 166, provided the federal government with greater amount of control of a 150-kilometer security strip along the border. This change was later confirmed by the Estado-Novo constitution of 1937. In this 150-kilometer strip, all new transactions, as well as any road and rail building, needed to be approved by the Superior National Security Council. There was also the requirement for businesses operating inside this 150-kilometer border strip to have a majority of Brazilian capital.

In 1939, new regulations required that inside the 150-kilometer border strip land buyers should be preferably of Brazilian citizenship, and in the case of foreigners, they needed to be at least the head of families with Brazilian-born children. In border settlements Brazilians should comprise at least 50 percent of the population, and any given foreign nationality should be no more than 25 percent of the population. Moreover, businesses located within the 150-kilometer border strip were required to have a majority of Brazilian-born partners, Brazilian-born administrators, and two thirds of Brazilian employees. The new border legislation created the Special Committee for the Border Strip (Comissão Especial da Faixa de Fronteiras - CEFF), subordinated to Superior National Security Council, whose mandate predicted the approval of land transactions involving foreigners and the review of all past state and municipal land grants. This new regulation on land ownership at the borders was issued at the same time the federal government created the Iguaçu National Park in 1939 on land that had been previously put to public use by the Paraná government. They were both part of a move by Rio de Janeiro to increase its control over public land concessions, to enlarge its power over states and municipalities, and to nationalize the borders. Local power would continue to own and give concessions of public land in the 150-kilometer border strip, but federal government through the CEFF had the final word in approving these transactions25.

In 1916 the state of Paraná issued the decree 653 expropriating the 1,008-hectare estate acquired by the foreign entrepreneur Jesús Val from the Military Colony of Foz do Iguaçu years before. The decree transformed the estate on the Brazilian margins of the falls into an area of public interest to receive a “village and a park”26. In 1930, another state decree (no. 2,153) tripled the area of public interest, setting 3,300 hectares for the establishment of a “settlement and a national park”. For the first time the term “national park” appears in the Brazilian legislation related to the Iguazu Falls. The decree, issued on October 20, was one of the first provisions taken by general Mario Tourinho, who had led Vargas’ coup in Paraná and had seized control of state government on October 5, just two days after the uprising had first broken in Rio Grande do Sul. The state decree 2,153 also donated the expropriated lands to the federal government, a move in line with the centralization of powers in the federal sphere characteristic of the Vargas regime27.
By the way of the 1930 revolutionary movement the lands surrounding the Iguazu Falls had fallen under the control of the federal government, which gave Rio de Janeiro the means to create a national park in the area, the second of the three national parks created by Vargas regime. In Brazil, the move by Vargas to implement a conservationist agenda between 1930 and 1945 was unprecedented - apart from the establishment of botanical gardens and the partial protection of Rio de Janeiro’s watershed, previous governments had never acted to establish a conservationist program. The change brought by Vargas had its roots in a new phenomenon in Brazil - the appearance on the national stage of a cadre of conservationists (many of them scientists) who, before 1937, managed to align US and Europe-born ideas of conservation of nature with a nationalist discourse akin to the one put forward by Vargas ideologues (Vargas himself appeared to have no interest in conservation)28. The theme gained momentum with the issuing of a forest code and the government sponsorship of the Conference for the Protection of Nature, both in 1934. The case for a park surrounding the Iguazu Falls aligned geopolitical concerns with the new conservationist agenda, which coupled with the support of the state of Paraná made possible the creation of Brazil’s second national park in what was then a remote and inaccessible area.

Following a visit to the state of Paraná, the ministry of agriculture Fernando Costa presented Vargas with a project for the creation of the Iguaçu National Park in December of 1938. The project envisaged a park based on the area donated by Paraná nine years before. Presenting national parks as a sign of modernity, the Costa cited several American national parks (Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, Sequoia, Yosemite, etc.) as well as national parks in Europe (Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, etc.) as a source of inspiration. Costa aimed to use parks to preserve natural monuments and landscapes, as well as to manage and create forests. The project stipulated an annual budget of 2.5 million contos de réis for park implementation. The text stressed the existence of an Argentine national park of “similar name and purpose”, and suggested the Brazilian park as a tool to “narrow the gap existing in the relations” between the two countries. On January 10, 1939 the laconic decree 23,793 created the Iguaçu National Park. The decree with seven articles did not stipulate the actual area of the park, which would be established after a survey. Also, differently from Costa’s project, the text of decree did not clearly discriminate the purpose of the national park, but it referred to forest code articles on the preservation of “primeval floristic composition” and “public natural monuments”, the action of local authorities, and the role of the forest police. In the same year technicians of the Ministry of Agriculture surveyed the area of the Iguazu Falls, and in 1940 the construction of park infrastructure began. The Brazilian government intended to implement at the Iguaçu National Park in Brazil a similar infrastructure the Argentine National Park Agency was building at their Iguazu National Park across the border. The Brazilian plan foresaw the building of an airport in Foz do Iguaçu to substitute the 1930s airstrip, a small hydroelectric dam, roads, park headquarters, and a great hotel to replace the small wooden inn built at the falls by local entrepreneurs. By 1942 airport construction was fully completed, and the new airport included a “beautiful passenger terminal in colonial style” in the words of a visitor. In the following years the park headquarters and the dam were completed, and the latter would become the main source of energy for both the park and the town of Foz do Iguaçu until the mid 1950s. Given the greater scale and costs, the construction of the Hotel only started after the war, in 1948, and it took ten years to be completed. By using the park budget to
build infrastructure like airport, roads, and a hydroelectric dam, the federal government took the opportunity to invest in the development of the frontier region, a contrast with what occurred with the two other national parks created in the state of Rio de Janeiro in the 1930s. A comparison of the investment in infrastructure made by the Brazilian government in the three parks reveals the importance of territorial concerns in the regime’s conservation policy. In the period between 1939 and 1945, the Iguaçu National Park, received about sixty-six percent of the budget destined to the building of infrastructure in the new national parks, despite the fact that it only received seven percent of the visitors of national parks in Brazil (see Graph 1).29

Graph 1: NATIONAL PARKS COMPARED

In the early 1940s, the nationalization of the bankrupt São Paulo-Rio Grande railroad resulted in the expropriation of vast expanses of land granted to the company by past governments. The Brazilian Forest Service took the opportunity to use some of this land to increase the park, from the original 3,300 hectares to the 200,000 hectares (see Map 7). However, in the following decades, this enlarged park existed mostly on paper. The process of actual incorporation of these new land, including surveys and expropriations, took several decades, and it occurred at the same time settlers coming from the southern states of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul were migrating into the region. This inevitably led to confrontations between settlers that, as the park increased, found themselves inside the borders of the park, and government agencies seeking to protect nature. The most dramatic episode occurred in the 1970s, at the height of the military dictatorship, when 457 families of settlers and squatters were removed from the expanded boundaries of the park.31

Despite the later neglect in enforcing territorial powers over the expanded park space occurring after the 1950s, the history of the creation of the Iguaçu National Park in the 1930s and 1940s is representative of the attempts by the Vargas regime to control land and territory in Brazil. The creation of a special regime for land occupation in the 150-kilometer border strip in 1934, the three national parks established in 1937 and 1939, and the dismemberment of five states, including Paraná, into the five new borders territories controlled directly by Rio de Janeiro...
in 1943 were all part of the same effort by the Federal government to curb regional elites, control the process of land occupation and colonization, and dominate the Brazil’s borderlands. With the ousting of Getúlio Vargas in 1945, the federal impetus to control land ebbed, and the federal government had to wait until the 1964 to resume its expansion, when the new military regime seized control of all the public land from the hand of the states.
Conclusion

Between the 1930s and the 1960s, the creation of national parks in Brazil reveals a common pattern. In general, parks were created in areas of dense forest, and presented natural features that could lend themselves to be monumentalized, such as waterfalls, canyons, mountains, islands, etc. Parks were deemed as national symbols, and as such, they should preserve extraordinary natural features. Visitation was one of the key elements in the conception of such parks. That is why many of them were located in areas near the major urban centers, like the parks of Itatiaia and Serra dos Órgãos, which were easily accessible to the residents of Rio de Janeiro. The Iguaçu National Park, however, was an outlier, as it was created in an area of difficult access, far away from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Curitiba. In fact, the isolation of the area, the strong presence of foreigners, the rivalry with Argentina, and the centralization of federal power against state autonomy, were all crucial factors for understanding the creation of the park.

In the words of Francisco Iglesias, head of the national park service in the 1940s, the creation of the park had been a “manly endeavor” that symbolized the Vargas's March to the West in its entirety. To Iglesias, the park would serve to integrate a “bastard and cosmopolitan” borderland population that was, at that time, “dominated” by a foreign language (the Spanish), a foreign currency (Argentine peso), and foreign customs. The government of Getúlio Vargas tapped into the ongoing conservationist discourse, adopted the old idea of creating a park in the falls, and implemented it as part of his larger policy of nationalization of the borders. By creating the park, the Brazilian state aimed to develop its southwestern borderlands and integrate it into the rest of the country.

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Notes

* The research for this article was done as part of a PhD dissertation on the compared environmental history of the Brazilian-Argentine border during the twentieth century, which will be defended in 2015.


2 The word Iguazu, derives from a Tupi-Guarani root meaning “big water,” and is spelled in several different manners in the documents -Iguaçu, Iguassú, Iguazú, and Iguazu. In this article, I chose to keep the Portuguese “Iguaçu” for the Brazilian national park, Parque Nacional do Iguacu (Iguaçu National Park), the Spanish “Iguazú” for the Argentine national park, Parque Nacional Iguazú (Iguazú National Park), and “Iguazu” for the geographical features (Iguazu River and Iguazu Falls).

3 Although the national park was only created in 1939, the idea of creating a park on the Brazilian banks of the Iguazu Falls existed since the late nineteenth century. The first proposal for the establishment of a national park in Latin America was put forward by the engineer, entrepreneur, and later abolitionist André Rebouças in 1876, just four years after the creation of the first national park in Yellowstone. Rebouças addressed his proposal to the Brazilian emperor Pedro II, to whom he was close, arguing for the creation of a national park in the western hinterland of the country, which would serve to protect two of the largest waterfalls in the world, Iguazu and Sete Quedas. See André Pinto Rebouças, “O Parque Nacional: Notas e Considerações Geraes”, in Provincia Do Paraná: Caminhos de Ferro Para Mato Grosso e Bolívia. Salto Do Guayra, Rio de Janeiro. Typographia Nacional, 1876. The pamphlet was later republished as Nestor Borba, André Pinto Rebouças, Excursão Ao Salto Do Guayra: O Parque Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, Casa Mont’Alverne, 1897.


5 For more on national parks in other Latin American countries in the same period, see Rodrigo Pizarro, “The Global


8 The Treaty of San Idelfonso (1777) defined the Iguaçu and Uruguay rivers as the border between the Spanish and Portuguese empires, thus establishing the northern banks of the Iguaçu as Portuguese territory. The area where the Iguaçu National Park is located had never been politically disputed by Argentina. However, a few hundred miles south, the region between the southern banks of the Iguaçu and the northern banks of the Uruguay was the locus of an intense dispute between the two countries. The tenure of this section was ill defined by the treaty, leading to conflicting claims between Argentina and Brazil. The dispute started after the end of the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) and was only solved in 1890 with the arbitration of the United States. See “Artículo VIII”, in Tratado preliminar sobre los limites de los estados pertenecientes a las Coronas de España y Portugal en la América Meridional; ajustado y concluido en San Lorenzo, a 11 de octubre de 1777, Buenos Aires, Imprenta del Estado, 1836; Ruy Christovam Wachowicz, Paraná, Sudoeste: Ocupação e Colonização, Curitiba, Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Etnográfico Paranaense, 1985.


10 Theophilo de Andrade, O Rio Paraná no Roteiro da Marcha para o Oeste, Rio de Janeiro, Imãos Pongetti, 1941, pp. 10-12, 23-26, 48-54, 60-62, 76-80, 83-84, 119-121; Cesar Martinez, Sertões do Iguaçu, São Paulo, Lobato, 1925.


12 In an interview to journalist Teresa Urban in the 1990s, the conservationist Paulo Nogueira Neto recalled his childhood memories on experiencing the region from above in a Panair flight. “The period of exile of my father gave me very important conservationist lessons. We would take a DC-3 to visit him in Buenos Aires, and the route was ... São Paulo, Curitiba, Foz do Iguaçu, Asunción, Buenos Aires. When we left Curitiba, there was some farms but, some minutes later, there was nothing more: no roads, no houses, only forest, forest, all the way to Foz do Iguaçu, which was a military garrison, a border post, and a landing strip. After Foz do Iguaçu, it was forest again all the way to Asunción in Paraguay. I saw this. I saw this forest disappears. What is left? A Conservation Unit that is the Iguaçu National Park created before the occupation of the region. This happened in 1938, 1940, and it made a lasting impression on me, as the only thing left is the park.” Teresa Urban, Saudade do Matão: Relembrando a História Da Conservação da Natureza no Brasil, Curitiba, Editora UFPR, 1998, pp. 156. See also João Gomes Ribeiro Filho, Relatório Apresentado ao Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo General de Divisão João Gomes Ribeiro Filho, Ministro de Estado da Guerra, em Maio de 1936, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa do Estado Maior do Exército, 1936, pp. 20, 67-69; Tânia Luiza Bonassa, “Estrada do Colono: Ações e Práticas Discursivas na Relação do Homem com a Natureza no Parque Nacional do Iguaçu”, M.A. Thesis, Federal University of Paraná, 2004, pp. 29; Manuel Carrão, op. cit., pp. 6, 45-49; Figueirêdo, op. cit., pp. 119, 121; Martinez, op. cit., pp. 107; Silveira Netto, op. cit., 33, 78-79; Wachowicz, op. cit., pp. 28-32, 35; Daniel Leb Sasaki, Pouso Forçado: a História Por Trás da Destruição da Panair do Brasil pelo Regime Militar, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2005, pp. 73-74.

13 Wachowicz, op. cit., pp. 11, 44-47.


15 The system of debt bondage was prevalent not only among Argentine companies, but also in the Brazilian Companhia Mate Laranjeira, a fact conveniently overlooked by most Brazilian informants, including João Cabanas. Like the rubber tapper in the Amazon, the obrage worker, known as mensu, was forbidden to grow food and was obliged to obtain supplies from the overpriced company’s warehouse, which consistently increased the debt. For workers, the only two options were flight or to die in debt. Wachowicz, op. cit., pp. 48-50; João Cabanas, A Columna da Morte Sob o Commando do Tenente Cabanas, Rio de Janeiro, Almeida & Torres, 1928, pp. 360-367; Carrão, op. cit., 64-66.
16 Cabanas also criticized the “journalists from Curitiba” and other visitors for failing to perceive the excessive Argentinization of the border. He derided those who toured the gorges of the Paraná River and visited the falls as guests of the mate companies and, which rendered them unable or unwilling to perceive the reality. Cabanas, op. cit., pp. 245-252.


18 Cables from Mário Tourinho to Oswaldo Aranha, July 9 and 30, 1931, Série Correspondência Política, Rolo 7 fot. 422, CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro; Letter from Getúlio Vargas to João Gomes Ribeiro, May 20, 1933, Série Correspondência, Rolo 3 fot. 0403 to 0408, CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro. We believe the letter is misdated because Vargas’ request in the letter—the deployment of a military company at Foz do Iguaçu—occurred in 1932.

19 Ribeiro Filho, op. cit., pp. 43.


22 Among the several arguments put forward by local elites against border territories was the idea that the creation of such territories meant to artificially divide the nation. Such parceling of states was against the federation principle, which conceived the nation as the sum of its autonomous states. This idea was defended by the congressman Generoso Ponce from Mato Grosso in March 1934 during the discussions for the writing of the new constitution, Annaes Da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, Vol. 9, Of. 1, Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional, 1934, pp. 200-201, 205, 213. See also Valdir Gregory, Os Eurobrasileiros e o Espaço Colonial: Migrações no Oeste do Paraná, 1940-1970, Cascavel, Brazil: Edunioeste, 2002, pp. 91; Wachowicz, op. cit., pp. 141-142, 147-148; Brazil, Decreto no. 19,482, January 12, 1930; Letter from the Committee for the Iguazu Territory to Oswaldo Aranha, Correspondência Política, Rolo 6 fot. 80 and 81, CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro: “Grande Comissão Nacional de Redivisão Territorial e Localização da Capital Federal.” Revista da Sociedade de Geographia do Rio de Janeiro, Nº 38, 1933, pp. 132.


The creation of the Argentine park at Iguazu in 1934 influenced Brazil to create its own park in 1939. However, the creation of the Argentine national park was also the result of developments in Brazil. After visiting the falls in 1897 the German-Argentine naturalist Hermann Burmeister warned that Brazil had already founded a military colony and planned to create a national park at their side of the border. This led Carlos Thays, a French-Argentine architect, to design the first plan for a national park and a military colony in the Argentine side in 1902. See Graciela Silvestri, *El lugar común: una historia de las figuras de paisaje en el Río de la Plata*, Buenos Aires, Edhasa, 2011, pp 360. See also Fernando Costa, *Projeto do Parque Nacional de Iguaçu*, December 27, 1938, G. M. 1036, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro; Brazil, Decree no. 23,793, January 23, 1934; Brazil, Decree no. 1,713, June 14, 1937; Brazil, Decree-Law no. 1,035, January 10, 1939; Cândido de Mello Leitão, *A Vida Na Selva*, São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, 1940, pp. 175-194.


The national parks created in Brazil in this period were: Itatiaia (1937); Iguacu, and Serra dos Órgãos (1939); Ubajara, Aparados da Serra, and Araguaia (1959); Emas, Chapada dos Veadeiros, Caparaó, Sete Cidades, Sete Quedas, São Joaquim, Tijuca, and Brasilia (1961). See Duarte, op. cit., pp. 25; Drummond, Franco, and Ninis, op. cit., pp. 473; Drummond, *O Sistema Brasileiro*, pp. 14-15.